Conceptual ethics and the work of metaphysics
Amie Thomasson
I have argued elsewhere that we should see metaphysics as fundamentally involved in conceptual work: not merely the kind of descriptive conceptual work of classical conceptual analysis, but also—and often more interestingly--normative conceptual work: work in conceptual ethics. If metaphysics centrally involves normative conceptual work, how ought we to be doing it? What methods and standards should we employ? While the idea that work in metaphysics in particular, or philosophy generally, may involve normative conceptual work has begun to gain some traction, far less has been said about how that work is to be done. Presumably there must be constraints, better and worse ways of engaging in this sort of conceptual choice, in order to make sense of the idea that we can engage in critiques of past or current concepts.
In this paper I aim to at least take some initial steps towards work on this issue, by weighing up two alternative approaches to answering this question: One is what we may call the ‘metaphysics-first approach’: the idea that our conceptual choices should be guided by and answerable to metaphysical facts—e.g. facts about what (really) exists, or facts about structure… The other is what we may call the ‘pragmatic approach’: the idea that our conceptual choices should be guided by broadly pragmatic considerations, including not considerations of ‘mere’ usefulness, but also, in at least some cases, by deeper ethical, normative, or political considerations. I will argue that the pragmatic approach is more plausible than you might have thought—perhaps even so plausible as to make the mysteries that come with the metaphysics-first approach come to seem avoidable and unnecessary.
Amie Thomasson
I have argued elsewhere that we should see metaphysics as fundamentally involved in conceptual work: not merely the kind of descriptive conceptual work of classical conceptual analysis, but also—and often more interestingly--normative conceptual work: work in conceptual ethics. If metaphysics centrally involves normative conceptual work, how ought we to be doing it? What methods and standards should we employ? While the idea that work in metaphysics in particular, or philosophy generally, may involve normative conceptual work has begun to gain some traction, far less has been said about how that work is to be done. Presumably there must be constraints, better and worse ways of engaging in this sort of conceptual choice, in order to make sense of the idea that we can engage in critiques of past or current concepts.
In this paper I aim to at least take some initial steps towards work on this issue, by weighing up two alternative approaches to answering this question: One is what we may call the ‘metaphysics-first approach’: the idea that our conceptual choices should be guided by and answerable to metaphysical facts—e.g. facts about what (really) exists, or facts about structure… The other is what we may call the ‘pragmatic approach’: the idea that our conceptual choices should be guided by broadly pragmatic considerations, including not considerations of ‘mere’ usefulness, but also, in at least some cases, by deeper ethical, normative, or political considerations. I will argue that the pragmatic approach is more plausible than you might have thought—perhaps even so plausible as to make the mysteries that come with the metaphysics-first approach come to seem avoidable and unnecessary.