Conceptual genealogy and conceptual engineering
Catarina Dutilh Novaes
In a 2015 article ('Conceptual genealogy for analytic philosophy'), I presented the details of a methodology which I call ‘conceptual genealogy’, and claimed that it is relevant for both the historian of philosophy and for the systematic philosopher seeking to understand a given philosophical concept. Inspired by Nietzsche’s conception of genealogy, I view (philosophical) concepts as undergoing significant changes over time; they are above all historical products rather than a-temporal natural kinds or essences, and bring along with them traces of their historical development as well as of broader cultural contexts. Indeed, one of the key aspects of typical genealogical approaches (as is clear in particular in Nietzsche) is an emphasis on the contingent nature of (philosophical) concepts and phenomena as products of long and winding historical developments. Moreover, a genealogical analysis of concepts takes into account the functions that a concept was expected to play at each stage of its development. It is largely in view of shifts of functions that concepts change over time, while at the same time maintaining layers of their previous instantiations (which thus may no longer have a clear function to play).
I take it that this genealogical account of concepts is very much in the spirit of the idea of conceptual engineering, in view of two components that the two frameworks share: the emphasis on the plasticity of concepts (as opposed to essentialist conceptions), and the functionalist perspective. And so, in my talk, I introduce the concept of conceptual genealogy in some detail and then draw connections with recent work on conceptual engineering.
Catarina Dutilh Novaes
In a 2015 article ('Conceptual genealogy for analytic philosophy'), I presented the details of a methodology which I call ‘conceptual genealogy’, and claimed that it is relevant for both the historian of philosophy and for the systematic philosopher seeking to understand a given philosophical concept. Inspired by Nietzsche’s conception of genealogy, I view (philosophical) concepts as undergoing significant changes over time; they are above all historical products rather than a-temporal natural kinds or essences, and bring along with them traces of their historical development as well as of broader cultural contexts. Indeed, one of the key aspects of typical genealogical approaches (as is clear in particular in Nietzsche) is an emphasis on the contingent nature of (philosophical) concepts and phenomena as products of long and winding historical developments. Moreover, a genealogical analysis of concepts takes into account the functions that a concept was expected to play at each stage of its development. It is largely in view of shifts of functions that concepts change over time, while at the same time maintaining layers of their previous instantiations (which thus may no longer have a clear function to play).
I take it that this genealogical account of concepts is very much in the spirit of the idea of conceptual engineering, in view of two components that the two frameworks share: the emphasis on the plasticity of concepts (as opposed to essentialist conceptions), and the functionalist perspective. And so, in my talk, I introduce the concept of conceptual genealogy in some detail and then draw connections with recent work on conceptual engineering.